I think the diamond formation could be the death of my club this season. West Ham seem to have prepared to play it in pre-season, and have bought players to fill the central roles this Summer, yet the evidence of the system (4-1-2-1-2) actually working consistently anywhere in the world are virtually nil to my knowledge.
It's a bizarre situation, and actually a strange leftover from Allardyce's last season. At face value it seems like West Ham last season found success in September and October playing the diamond formation, then abandoned it and found relegation form instead. That's the shallow interpretation of what happened. I think if you look closely at the circumstances and the context for the 'success' with the diamond, you get an encapsulation of why it frankly doesn't work.
If you look at the meta of football formations, it seems that there's a cycle of circumstances in modern times. Clubs tend to play one up front and pack the midfield for safety, and then at some point or other that system can seem a bit stale and unaggressive. So teams do experiment with formations that play two up front, either with a 4-4-2, or the diamond midfield, or even 3-5-2 with wing-backs. Invariably clubs then go through a period of experimentation and then revert to some variation of one up front, for the simple reason that to play two up front means sacrifices and less solidity elsewhere in the side. These experiments will keep happening, and maybe at some point the meta will change. But it hasn't yet.
Now it just so happens that West Ham started experimenting last season at the same time as some other clubs in the Premiership. Our first game with a diamond was against Hull, who also coincidentally played a diamond formation. Then we played Liverpool, who also coincidentally played a diamond against us. And then we played Man Utd, who were also playing a diamond. There is absolutely no doubt that we outplayed Liverpool particularly, and fans got very excited about this - in hindsight we can say that the Liverpool we beat were in pretty shocking form by their standards. And what seemed like evidence that the diamond formation was working against other formations was a false positive in many ways - it didn't necessarily work against other formations, it only worked against a mirror of the same formation.
Also, our diamond success coincided with a couple of other factors. Forwards Sakho and Valencia, both bought by the club that Summer, with Allardyce expected to find some sort of role for them to play, even though his preferred system doesn't really have a natural place for either. So, by his own admission, he chucked them in together away at Hull in hope rather than expectation, and their sheer work-rate working the channels and generally being a massive nuisance was incredible. It still needed a wonder-strike from Valencia to earn a draw in that match though. Also, Stewart Downing, moved to the tip of the diamond, found a lease of life and a bunch of space behind those two forwards, and for short bursts it all really clicked.
So for a short burst of games the diamond flattered to deceive, with a handful of eager players in tip-top form. We also played clubs who, for whatever reason, were experimenting themselves. We also then beat QPR and Burnley, poor teams destined to be relegated, which also flattered the approach. Even within these matches the system blew incredibly hot and cold - our first half against Burnley was desperately poor, but one 15-minute burst of attacking movement blew them away in the second half. It felt like a new start.
But then, over time, the diamond faltered. The incredible demands it made on the forwards took its toll, with both picking up injuries. Opponents got wise to Downing, who went from one of the hottest form players in the league to a bystander in games. So Allardyce, ever the pragmatist, reverted to his normal plan for attritional survival football (Carroll and Nolan's special partnership up front), and fans spent the rest of the season lamenting this success under the diamond formation, and blaming Allardyce for its eventual demise.
It's not even the first time this has happened at the club. Zola used the diamond for his most successful spell at the club in 2008/9, with Cole in the form of his career earning an England call-up off the back of it. That time it was the work-rate of Collison and Behrami covering the flanks that made the system zing for a while - both picked up serious knee injuries soon afterwards, and I have to wonder whether that was coincidence. In similar circumstances Zola once again found that once the novelty of a free-spirited system wore off, the diamond just doesn't work over time.
The problems with the diamond are obvious. It is weak on the flanks. It exposes your full backs in defence, and relies heavily on their energy to get forward. Midfield organisation is a problem - players have to cover both centrally and on the flanks, so it lacks the rigidity of other systems where players can know who they are meant to be picking up. It is too easily exploited - any canny team knows where the weakness in the formation is and can easily exploit it. It is difficult to press the ball when you know there are going to be free men to pass to out wide - by the same token it makes it easier for the opposition to play, and takes the pressure off their possession. It is one of those formations where you have to throw caution to the wind and try and outscore the opposition - fun for fans but hardly a proven method for prolonged good form. I think it's a gamble, basically - a novelty approach that can throw off an opponent if unexpected.
I would guess what has happened this Summer is that new manager Slaven Bilic has asked the players for their input, and they have said that they want to play the diamond. They remember it working, the fans haven't shut up about it since, and there's no doubt it does suit a number of the players. Basically every winger would love to play centrally, every central attacker wants a system built around them, and every midfielder would like the freedom to express themselves - the diamond provides both.
But it doesn't work very well. Or rather it either works incredibly well or incredibly badly.
One thing that Zola tried to do was to play the diamond and then, once the team had pulled ahead in the match, he switched to a safer formation to see the game out. But I don't think this option is easily open to Bilic, with a lack of wide players with defensive attributes in his squad. Considering Downing has moved on this Summer, his 'replacement' Payet was surely not bought to play out wide, having provided so much creativity in a central role at Marseille. Zarate, back in the fold after being inexplicably frozen out under Allardyce, simply cannot play wide.
So as it turns out, I think two maligned members of the squad, Amalfitano and Jarvis, may have to be employed in the wider roles if and when the diamond formation comes unstuck. I think Amalfitano is seriously underrated at the club, and can play almost anywhere across the midfield and contribute intelligently. But Jarvis has had a torrid time since moving from Wolves three seasons ago for a club record fee, with almost literally nothing to show for all that head-down forward running other then a few corners won!
All in all it's more evidence of the real problem at West Ham, which is the dreadful lack of football expertise behind the scenes. It led previously to the club relying too heavily on Allardyce's school of thought, and it now leads to Bilic arriving virtually blind into a club with little continuity of staff or knowledge with the previous regime. The club, in my opinion, is in desperate need of a Les Reed type of character, a general manager or director of football, or just a football man to provide continuity, a thoughtful guiding hand to help lead the staff as a unit in a forward direction, rather than frantically splashing around from one disaster to the next.
No comments:
Post a Comment